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A Comparative Analysis
There are many interesting parallels between the political dynamics related to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals1 and the goals 
of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention.2 Both 
are completing their first five-year review process and 
consider the year 2005 to be a milestone regarding the 
assessment of previous achievements and projection of 
future needs. They equally use an endorsed action plan 
to better direct the efforts of the international commu-
nity and similarly thrive on the synergy of more than 
1,000 dedicated non-governmental organizations. 
Global calls for a total ban on the use of anti-personnel 
landmines and for a “mine-free world” are identical in 
their characteristics to global calls for “making poverty 
history.” Shocking catchphrases like “10 million children 
die of the consequences of extreme poverty every year,” or 
“one child every three seconds” remind us of the way the 
tragic impact of landmines has been depicted on a global 
scale: “one landmine victim every 20 minutes.” 
The campaign to free the world of landmines start-
ed well before the Millennium Development Goals 
campaign, and with some similarities. They obviously 
differ in scope, size and dimension; however, both of-
fer an increasing number of valuable insights on how 
to mobilize an often more-divided-than-unified donor 
community behind a well-known, ambitious vision for 
a better world.
Most readers are familiar with the relative successes of 
the Convention, so let’s briefly analyze why the practice 
of the MDGs as a development framework has been more 
successful where others have failed. At present, the eight 
MDGs—which range from cutting extreme poverty in 
half to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and provid-
ing universal primary education, all by the target date 
of 2015—form a blueprint agreed to by all the world’s 
countries and the entire world’s leading development in-
stitutions. All eight of the MDGs, and the correspond-
ing 18 targets, are taken directly from the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration of 2000.3 The most touching 
development objectives are directly related to the lives 
of people, and that is the exact reason why they have 
galvanized unprecedented efforts to meet the needs of 
the world’s poorest. This is much better compared to 
earlier abstract or economic goal set-
tings such as 5-percent income growth 
or other gross-domestic-product-related 
formulas or quantifications. The first successful round of the MDGs goes hand-in-hand 
with the impressive support for the Convention and its comparable tangible humanitar-
ian goals and deadlines. However, the latter is still far from having universal support. 
In relative terms, how is the progress in reaching the MDGs compared to making the 
deadlines of the Convention?
Well, it is quite obvious that at the current rate of progress, we are neither on track to 
realize the MDGs in 2015, nor make many of the 10-year deadlines of the Convention for 
a mine-free status of mine-affected member states. Unfortunately, if there is not a greater 
sense of urgency, we are not going to be even close, especially in Africa. For the MDGs, the 
recently published 2005 Human Development Report4 serves as a wake-up call, indicating it 
is not a hopeless situation. Significant progress is considered possible and realistic; for this 
reason alone, a “we-can-do-it message” remains essential. 
The report focuses on three pillars in order to rid the world of extreme poverty: 
The first pillar is international aid and how resources should be best allocated for devel-
opment. For decades, many billions of dollars have been spent with limited results. Many 
experts have drawn one main conclusion: when money is spent without the required govern-
mental reform, international efforts are virtually doomed to fail. 
The second pillar highlights the tremendous potential of fair trade—likely more im-
portant than the first pillar. The trade-instead-of-aid principle has a lot of relevance, but 
it might only reach its full potential in a world with more equality and less subsidized or 
protectionist economies. 
The third pillar is security and post-conflict reconstruction. Loss of security or relapse 
to conflict can cause a loss of decades of development progress. It is evident that mine action 
can play a vital role in this domain. 
With the Human Development Report having a critical role in reshaping the debate on 
development in an unequal world, it manages to link the three essential pillars for develop-
ment in a more holistic way than the MDG framework. We then have to ask how and if we 
should (or could) pair mine action effectively with the MDGs. Do we need extra tools or 
need to pursue a further extension of the development debate to overcome the near absence 
of security-related goals and targets in the MDGs? To answer this question, we need first to 
take a closer look at the politics involved.
The Politics of Mine Action
Mine action, as a multidisciplinary and multidimensional activity, is manifestly pres-
ent at the three different levels of politics: high, medium and low (explicated below). 
Combined, they influence how mine action resources are mobilized and allocated.  
The high politics of mine action entail the strategic and political interactions on 
mine action legal instruments or related issues between sovereign states themselves, 
between states and the United Nations, and in a particular way, between states and 
the civil society or regional organizations. Today the “Ottawa model” is exemplary for 
other disarmament activities (e.g., small arms) on how the high politics of mine action 
have been very effective in moving the world towards 
a “mine free” state. 
Low politics can be defined as the socio-economic 
or development factors influencing the implementation 
of mine action.  More specifically, low politics are the 
impact of mine contamination on nation-building pro-
cesses and national development programs, as shown in 
Landmine Impact Surveys. The very important politics 
at this level require sufficient national and local owner-
ship of the mine problem to be truly effective. National 
and local decision-making should even have the ability to 
reprioritize funding originally intended for mine action 
whenever other more urgent socio-economic or develop-
ment needs arise. 
Having defined the high and low politics of mine ac-
tion, it is suggested that there are also medium politics. 
These are the political dynamics within international 
organizations, regional organizations or the civil society 
itself—the interactions among non-governmental organi-
zations, the United Nations, the International Committee 
for the Red Cross and regional political bodies such as 
the European Union and the Organization of American 
States, who altogether comprise the medium politics of 
mine action. Some of the more critical voices might call 
them the middling politics of mine action, since phenom-
ena such as funding competition, turf protection and 
“clubbiness” mentality could sporadically form obstacles 
between the high and low politics of mine action. 
Indeed, to optimize the global results of the politics of mine action, 
these three levels should act in harmony. This becomes more challeng-
ing beyond the emergency response phase of mine action. When 
there are high numbers of mine victims, the three political levels 
of mine action tend to remain well synchronized. However, the 
views of donor countries, the United Nations, NGOs, the 
World Bank and mine-affected states regarding the utility 
of certain mine action projects—especially when there are 
many competing demands—quickly diverge and con-
sequently complicate the allocation of resources when 
mine action should be included in development and 
post-conflict restoration programmes. 
On the other hand, mine action has significantly ma-
tured over the last years towards an increasingly efficient 
and effective combined effort to quickly address humani-
tarian emergencies, reduce security risks and threats, and 
contribute to development and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion. However, once beyond emergency relief, an exter-
nal consultative process becomes essential. It will not 
only help converge the views of the actors at the differ-
ent political levels of mine action but also better integrate 
mine action into overall strategic aims of the development 
and/or post-conflict restoration plans.  
Linking up Mine Action with the MDGs
Having highlighted some aspects of the politics of mine action, 
how can we facilitate their effective inclusion into the current realm 
of global development goal-setting? The millennium goals are focused 
and concrete, but they do not particularly reach out to the different political 
levels of mine action or other disarmament activities. Past, vague or even disputable 
statements might not suffice in today’s strife for clinical economics and a more quantifi-
able, reliable and especially comparable measurement of socio-economic benefits amongst 
programmes and projects.  
Since 2005 is presented as a breakthrough year in reaching the MDGs, mine action 
should immediately review how it can fit in and benefit from the Millennium momentum. 
Is this currently happening? Only to a limited extent. For a number of reasons, mine 
action’s mainstreaming in broader development goals has been a somewhat slow process. 
One does not have to go back too far in time to discover that mine action was kept de-
liberately outside the development debate to protect and accentuate its humanitarian im-
perative. This also confusingly led to redundant terminology such as humanitarian mine 
action—as if developmental mine action had still to be created. 
Which mechanism can harmonize the multilevel mine action politics towards the 
MDGs? Will it be sufficient to enhance current external consultative processes and set 
aside concerns that this might reduce mine action funding due to other more competi-
tive development activities? Should we better explore the opportunities to more sub-
stantially integrate mine action into substrategies relative to the MDGs? Once more, 
being the world’s time-bound and quantified targets, the MDGs are what they are: 
eight strategic development goals. The mine action community might not obtain the 
desired result by creating a specific ninth MDG solely for addressing mine action pur-
poses. Certain significantly mine-affected countries have done this or are in the process 
of doing so, but mobilizing additional resources beyond the funding required for the 
internationally endorsed MDGs is still to be seen, especially since the current funding 
is already largely insufficient. 
Consequently, the subordinate planning level of the MDGs is likely a much more suit-
able mechanism since it allows a more substantial and tangible inclusion of national mine 
action goals and strategic plans into concepts such as poverty-reduction strategy papers, 
national development plans, security-sector reform plans, emergency-response plans and 
needs-analysis frameworks. Nevertheless, there are also potential pitfalls and obstacles. 
Frequently, there is a lack of nationally driven plans. Those that exist suffer from un-
realistic expectations, fragmentation, gaps or duplication. One should expect to detect 
inadequate links between priorities in the political and security arena and the economic 
and social arena. Unfortunately, new indigenous governments overloaded with too many 
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The author compares the U.N. Millennium Development Goals 
with the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention, and sees that 
both should be adjusted to assure future success.
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planning decisions are also more the rule than the ex-
ception, often giving way to an early loss of momentum 
in the process of post-conflict restoration.
Recommendations
Due to its complexity and cross-cutting character-
istics, mine action will have to continue to firmly make 
its case to improve its mainstreaming into development 
activities in mine-affected states. This should not cause 
concern but rather acceptance of a broader prioritization 
process, whereby no scarce funding should go to the 
“demining of mountaintops or deserts” whilst the popu-
lation in the valley is suffering—or worse, dying from 
the consequences of extreme poverty. There is no ratio-
nale that can justify this—neither a humanitarian, nor 
a development or even an Ottawa Convention one. The 
straightforward rationale to prevail should be the pri-
oritization of those humanitarian and/or development 
projects that most significantly reduce human suffering 
or create the biggest socio-economic benefits. In this re-
gard, the strategic guidance from the MDG framework 
is very helpful and the option to extend Convention 
deadlines very useful.  
Mine action should focus on the subordinate plan-
ning level to the MDGs rather than create additional 
Millennium Goals. Appropriate and coordinated ac-
tion should be undertaken at the three political levels of 
mine action to encourage governments to include mine 
action impact assessments in all development plan-
ning, and to incorporate a concrete and practical stra-
tegic plan for mine action in the national development 
plan and poverty-reduction strategies. In this regard, 
mechanisms should be pursued where all partners work 
through a common national assessment of needs. Mere 
information-sharing is not enough. The needs-analysis 
framework and above-mentioned strategies should pro-
vide the necessary information and logical underpin-
ning for an overarching MDG strategy and accompany-
ing nation-specific action plan. To regard the MDGs as 
a stand-alone concept is quite impracticable.
Analyzing a post-conflict environment is very com-
plex, especially with an ongoing mixture of develop-
ment aid and emergency relief efforts. Success in cre-
ating a better understanding has been limited. The 
number of highly volatile factors makes it a daunting 
task to indicate reliable, long-term socio-economic 
benefits. To maintain its credibility, the mine action 
sector should avoid overstating the beneficial develop-
mental impact of mine clearance, such as automatically 
calling the majority of their projects “high priority” if 
land can have any use in the future or referring to im-
pressive socio-economic benefits that were “calculated” 
years ago.
As a closing note, it is important to continuously un-
derline the real human costs and human faces behind 
all the figures, goals or deadlines. Human development 
is still much more than the MDGs, Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper or even the Convention, but they re-
main critical yardsticks. Therefore, the campaigns for 
a “mine-free world” or “making poverty history” should 
not refrain from using the confrontational element of 
detailing the human costs of missed targets and dead-
lines. Once more, business as usual will not be sufficient. 
The credibility of the big and powerful donor countries 
is clearly at stake if these historical promissory notes do 
not get beyond the many pledges made at fancy summits 
and banquets.
See “References and Endnotes,” page 106 
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E-mail: vanderlinden@un.org A s the demining industry moves towards its rightful place as just another member of the community of organizations supporting de-
velopment in post-conflict situations, a new layer of 
responsibility is emerging. It is no longer acceptable to 
simply get the mine out of the ground in the safest pos-
sible way with minimal regard to consequences. It is 
agreed that demining supports some vague notion of 
subsequent use of the land. But the development per-
spective imposes a new reality. Subsequent use should 
inform, influence and perhaps even dominate decisions 
about the demining process.1
When I first joined the demining industry in 2000, I 
arrived with experience as a biologist dealing with envi-
ronmental issues. I immediately recognised remarkable 
overlap between post-conflict and environmental man-
agement in terms of need and consequence. Wars pol-
lute the landscape and destroy infrastructure. So does 
deforestation, for example. Human society depends as much on ecological infrastructure 
as on human-created infrastructure, even if we do not value the former because it is self-
maintaining and inconspicuous. Lost or destroyed infrastructure leads to precarious human 
existence. In terms of this principle, it makes no difference if the loss is of sewage disposal 
systems (which means high rates of sickness) or of roots that bind soil on hillsides (leading to 
erosion, landslides, destroyed agricultural land and famine). The result is the same—ruin.
Wars dramatically change the way in which local environments are used and managed by 
local people, often with devastating consequences. For example, through the 1990s, the el-
ephants of western Africa suffered massive mortality because of an increase in the availability 
of weapons as a result of local wars.2 The destruction followed an earlier period of increased 
mortality due to poaching for ivory. These pressures are now somewhat reduced, but neither 
has been eliminated, and pessimistic reviewers already regard the forest elephants of western 
Africa as a species being driven to extinction.3
But let it be said, wars can have ecologically positive effects. Wars frequently remove 
people from the landscape, reducing an impact that in at least some cases may have been 
unsustainable. Examples include reduced grazing pressures that improve the diversity of 
local vegetation communities and allow native wildlife to return to land from which it has 
been excluded. Reduced rates of firewood collection allow recovery of stressed forests subject 
The author takes a look at the environmental impact of demining and shows 
how demining not only affects the environment but also bears heavily on 
development and economics.
by Ian McLean [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
environmental Applications in Demining
Removing all vegetation, even in countries like Cambodia and Sudan where vegetation is prolific, can severely damage the environment. Some important plants do not reinvade easily.
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Humanitarian Demining as a Precursor to economic Development, Lundberg [ from page 53 ]
endnotes
1.  Dique, Jorge. “Mozambique Government to Revive Coal Mines and Port,” South Africa Mail and Guardian, Feb. 27, 1997.
2.  SA Looks for Rich Pickings in the Valley. Oct. 29, 2003. Text obtained from http://www.eprop.co.za/news/article.aspx?idArticle=2686. Accessed Oct. 25, 2005.
The Road to Mine Action and Development: The Life-cycle Perspective of Mine Action, Paterson and Filippino 
[ from page 55 ]
endnotes
1. This phrase is from The World Bank, which has been in the forefront of planning, managing and financing post-conflict reconstruction since the wars arising from the break-up 
of Yugoslavia. The central role played by the World Bank is one of the defining features of post-war reconstruction efforts, and during such periods the Bank may be an important 
source of financing for demining.
2. Regular readers will notice a strong similarity to Figure 1 in the article from Issue 9.1 (Chip Bowness, “The Missing Link in Strategic Planning: ALARA and the End-state 
Strategy Concept for National Mine Action Planning”), which was developed independently in 1998 by Chip Bowness to illustrate the “End-state Strategy” approach to develop-
ing a national mine action strategy for Cambodia. GICHD personnel developed the life-cycle perspective to illustrate not only that the size of a programme would eventually 
diminish, but also that the principal purposes of and partnerships for a mine action programme will evolve in a manner that can be understood and planned for. 
3. Raw data does not help decision-makers unless it is “analysed” into information. Information is the right data presented in the right format at the right time to the right people.
Mine Action and the Millennium Development Goals, Van Der Linden [ from page 58 ]
endnotes
1. United Nations Millennium Development Goals. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/pdf/MDG Book.pdf. Accessed Oct. 10, 2005.
2. “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.” Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997.  
http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Oct. 10, 2005. 
3. More detailed information on the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 2000, the eight MDGs, its related 18 targets and 46 indicators, can be found on the United Nations’  
Web site: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals.
4. For more information visit the Human Development Report Web site: http://hdr.undp.org.
environmental Applications in Demining, McLean [ from page 60 ]
endnotes
1. Harpviken, K.B., Isaksen, J. 2004. Reclaiming the Fields of War: Mainstreaming Mine Action in Development. UNDP, New York.
2. Blake, S., Hedges, S. 2004. “Sinking the Flagship: The Case of Forest Elephants in Asia and Africa.” Conservation Biology 18, 1191–1202.
3. Barnes, R.F.W. 1999. “Is There a Future for Elephants in West Africa?” Mammal Review 29, 175–199.
4. Editor’s Note: Some countries and mine action organizations are urging the use of the term “mine free”, while others are espousing the term “mine safe” or “impact free.” “Mine 
free” connotes a condition where all landmines have been cleared, whereas the terms “mine safe” and “impact free” refer to the condition in which landmines no longer pose a 
credible threat to a community or country. 
5. A Study of Mechanical Applications in Demining. GICHD, 2004, Geneva.
6.   GICHD, 2005. The Environmental Effects of Mechanical Application in Demining. Geneva, Switzerland.
7.   Banks, E. April 2003. “Spoiled Soil.” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 7.1, 56–58. Also available online at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/7.1/focus/banks/banks.htm. Accessed Dec. 9, 2005.
8.  Orr, D. December 2004. “Orr’s Laws.” Conservation Biology, Volume 18, 1457–1460.  Available online at 
 http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1523-1739.2004.01862.x. Accessed Dec. 9, 2005. 
9.   Nachon, C.T. 2004. “The Environmental Impacts of Landmines.” In:  Matthew, R.A., McDonald, B., Rutherford, K.R (Eds.), Landmines and Human Security, SUNY Press, New York. 
chris North, Dombrower [ from page 62 ]
endnotes
1. To meet EOD level-three qualifications, a deminer must have specific training in disposal by detonation of larger UXO and artillery ammunition up to 240 mm.  
A level-three deminer should be qualified to render safe UXO for safe removal from the demining worksite and to undertake their final destruction.
2.  These books can only be purchased by contacting Chris North at Chrisnorth69@hotmail.com or through his publisher, The Old Pier House. 
Becoming Part of the Hope, Begley [ from page 65 ]
endnote
1.  HALO Trust is supported through donations by private and public donors. This includes the governments of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. Other donors include Anti Landmyn Stichting, the European Commission, Foundation Pro 
Victimis, The Association to Aid Refugees, The Princess of Wales Memorial Fund and the United Nations. More information can be found at  
http://www.halotrust.org.
 
Steel Wheels in Mozambique, Van Zyl [ from page 69 ]
endnotes
1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer or Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Sept. 18, 1997, Ottawa, Canada.
 http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text/english. Accessed Oct. 17, 2005.
2.  July 1996, Copenhagen, International Conference on Mine Clearance Technology. http://www.un.org/Depts/dha/mct/. Accessed Oct. 12, 2005.
3. April 1997, Bonn Conference, held by the International Association for Conflict Management. http://www.iacm-conflict.org/SIGNAL/signal-v12-2.pdf. Accessed Oct. 12, 2005.
4.   Dr. Vernon P. Joynt later designed the first wedge-shaped mine-protected vehicle and headed the team that designed the mine-protected ambulance and developed a series of 
 civilian mine-protected vehicles. Information found at http://www.nixt.co.za/content/whoswho.htm. Accessed Oct. 12, 2005.
5.   USSR manufactured antipersonnel mine that contains a large amount of explosives, and the injuries it inflicts are often fatal. It is designed in such a way that it is practically 
impossible to neutralize. http://philcox.homestead.com/mines.html. Accessed Oct. 17, 2005.
6.   Weapon developed for motorized infantry, adopted for service with the Soviet army in 1949. For more information,  
visit http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/appendixcminesandordinance.html. 
7.  Conventional tank that has been used more than any other type of tank since World War II. For more information,  
visit http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/appendixcminesandordinance.html.  
8.   Eight-wheel-drive amphibious personnel carrier. For more information, visit http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/appendixcminesandordinance.html.
9.   Hungarian-manufactured AP blast mine closely resembling the PMN. For more information,  
visit http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/appendixcminesandordinance.html.
10.  USSR-manufactured rudimentary pressure-activated blast device in a wooden box. For more information,  
visit http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/appendixcminesandordinance.html.
11. Portuguese-manufactured hard-to-detect anti-personnel mine. For more information,  
visit http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/appendixcminesandordinance.html.
12. USSR-manufactured fragmentation bounding mine whose resulting blast shatters into more than 1000 metal splinters. For more information,  
visit http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/appendixcminesandordinance.html.
13. USSR-manufactured fragmentation bounding mine. For more information, visit http://www.eng.warwick.ac.uk/DTU/pubs/wp/wp48/appendixcminesandordinance.html.
Learning Takes Many Forms During Mine Action Managers’ course, Neitzey [ from page 72 ]
endnotes
1. Personal interview with Col. Antoine Nimbesha, assistant chief of operation of the Mine Action Coordination Centre, (Onu, Burundi). July 21, 2005.
2. Personal interview with Dr. Adriano Francisco Gonçalves of the National Inter-Sectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Angola). July 22, 2005.
3. Personal interview with Javed Habib-ul-Haq of the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan. July 21, 2005.
4. Personal interview with Thor Chetha of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority. July 22, 2005.
Suriname Demining Mission, Ruan [ from page 75 ]
endnotes
1.  A. Edgardo C. Reis, “Demining in Suriname,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 5.2, Aug. 2001, p. 19 or online at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.2/focus/edgardoreis.htm. Accessed 
Dec. 6, 2005.
2.  The PRB M409 is a plastic-bodied, low metal content, circular anti-personnel mine.
3.  See the text for the International Mine Action Standards at http://www.mineactionstandards.org/imas.htm, accessed Dec. 2, 2005.
4.  Editor’s Note: Some countries and mine action organizations are urging the use of the term “mine free”, while others are espousing the term “mine safe” or “impact free.” “Mine 
free” connotes a condition where all landmines have been cleared, whereas the terms “mine safe” and “impact free” refer to the condition in which landmines no longer pose a 
credible threat to a community or country.
5.  “Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.” Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997.  
http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed Dec. 2, 2005. 
That Landmine Thing: Students Take On the Landmine crisis, Hudson and Fuentes [ from page 77 ]
endnote
1.  For more information about the International Baccalaureate North America Office see http://www.ibo.org/ibo/index.cfm. Accessed Nov. 1, 2005.
From Interventions to Integration: Mine Risk education and community Liaison, Durham [ from page 80 ]
endnotes
1. International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) http://www.mineactionstandards.org. Last accessed Oct. 17, 2005.
2. Rosenstock, I. M. 1974, “Historical Origins of the Health Belief Model.” Health Education Monographs, 2 (4), 328–335.
3. Bandura, A. 1977, Social Learning Theory. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
4. Ajzen, I. & Fishbein, M. 1980, Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behaviour. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
5. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. 2003, A Guide to Mine Action. Geneva, Switzerland.
6. Germain, C. B. & Gitterman, A. 1980, The Life Model of Social Work Practice, Columbia University Press, New York.
7. Green, L. and Kreuter, M.W. 1999, Health Promotion Planning: An Educational and Ecological Approach, 3rd ed. Mayfield Publishing Company, Mountain View, Calif.
Playgrounds Without Mines, Roseg [ from page 81 ]
endnote
1. “New Safe Play Areas for Worst Affected Kids in Gaza,” Aug. 12, 2005, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/VBOL-6F7DGE?OpenDocument. 
 Accessed Aug. 12, 2005.
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